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Meet the Press
Sunday, May 23, 1999
GUESTS
Representative CHRIS COX, (R-Calif.)
Chairman, Select Committee on
Technology Transfers to China
NOTRA TRULOCK
Acting Deputy Director,
Office of Intelligence Department of Energy
MODERATOR/PANELIST: Tim Russert - NBC News
MR. RUSSERT: Our issues this Sunday, today, for the first time, the man who uncovered Chinese spying at our nuclear labs tells his story directly to the American people. In his first television interview, the head of intelligence for the Department of Energy, Notra Trulock.
And a congressional committee has unanimously concluded China stole nuclear secrets. With us, the chairman, Congressman Chris Cox.
Joining us, the head of intelligence for the Department of Energy, Notra Trulock. Mr. Trulock, welcome.
MR. TRULOCK: Thank you, Mr. Russert.
MR. RUSSERT: Congressman Chris Cox the chairman of a bipartisan committee looking into this matter. Congressman, good morning.
REP. COX: Good morning.
MR. RUSSERT: Mr. Trulock, let me start with you. In 1995, you met with representatives in the Energy Department and concluded what?
MR. TRULOCK: In 1995, we received the initial indications of espionage at the National Laboratories. We spent another several months reviewing the evidence carefully, and by September of 1995, we had concluded that, indeed, classified information had been compromised and that information could play a role in accelerating the Chinese nuclear weapons program. Those conclusions have been validated in the intelligence community damage assessment that was completed about a month ago.
MR. RUSSERT: In your professional judgment, do you have any doubt that there has been Chinese espionage at our nuclear labs?
MR. TRULOCK: I am convinced there has been Chinese nuclear espionage at our laboratories, yes, sir.
MR. RUSSERT: Congressman Chris Cox, your committee has been looking into this for months. On Tuesday, you will officially release your report. Much of it has seeped out into the public. Can you tell us this morning, are you convinced that there has been Chinese espionage at our nuclear laboratories?
REP. COX: Indeed, that is one of the principal findings of the select committee's bipartisan and unanimous report. That espionage didn't begin last week either. It has been occurring now for some decades. But importantly, it continues, we state in our report, to this very day, and for that reason more than anything, the Democrats and Republicans working together on this committee are anxious to see the Congress and the administration address these problems head-on and fix them, and arrest the continuing espionage and then lock up the damage.
MR. RUSSERT: Your committee voted 9-to-nothing, five Republicans and four Democrats unanimously agreeing on this decision.
REP. COX: That's correct. And as you might expect, Democrats and Republicans, when it comes to military matters, as well as domestic policy, have plenty of disagreements. We left all of our disagreements on the cutting room floor, because the facts that we present in your report were so stark, so grave and so important, and we presented that report on January 3rd to the president. One copy was then kept in our safe. And on Tuesday of this week, a declassified version of that report representing, I'd say, roughly 70 percent of the original contents will be made public so that we can discuss in Congress, in committee, with the administration and with the public, which is absolutely necessary to democracy, the steps that we now need to take in order to fix the problem.
MR. RUSSERT: Congressman, last week on this program, the Chinese ambassador to the United States was here. And I asked him a very specific question. This is the answer he gave about Chinese espionage, and I'll read it to you: "This is an intentional and deliberate fabrication of stories and deliberate insult on the Chinese. I can assure you we have never stolen any so-called high-tech from the United States.”
To put it bluntly, is the Chinese ambassador telling the truth?
REP. COX: Well, of course, this is part of the denial and deception campaign that is part of the espionage itself. When Zhu Rongji visited the United States, many reporters who questioned him didn't realize that in the PRC system and in the Communist system, the MSS, the Ministry of State Security, reports directly to Zhu Rongji. And so he, above all others, knew precisely what was going on. But we oughtn't expect a Perry Masonlike confession from Ambassador Li or from Zhu Rongji. It is up to the United States now, knowing what we know, to take the necessary steps to improve our counterintelligence so that this cannot happen to us again. And, of course, in a certain sense, this can't happen to us again because the horses are out the barn door, but we can now deny the People's Republic of China and the People's Liberation Army at least some of the tools that they'll need to perfect what they've stolen.
MR. RUSSERT: Mr. Trulock, let me help the public here and clear up some details on the chronology. In April of 1996, you briefed national security adviser to the president Sandy Berger.
MR. TRULOCK: Yes, I did.
MR. RUSSERT: In March of this year, on this program, he talked about that briefing. He said it was very general. Was it general or specific?
MR. TRULOCK: I attempted to communicate to him as explicitly as I could the findings of our efforts to date, which I have mentioned to you already, the fact of the espionage, the scope, and magnitude of the problem at that time, and the fact that we had also identified a number of suspects, and were working with the FBI to begin the criminal phase of this particular investigation. My judgment, it was explicit and to the point.
MR. RUSSERT: He then said that he briefed the president after that April '96 briefing from you. And he said, "I think we acted swiftly.” In your professional judgment, did Mr. Berger, the president, act swiftly after your April '96 briefing?
MR. TRULOCK: I would say that in mid-1997, we were sufficiently concerned about the lack of progress within the department that we specifically went to the White House and sought their assistance in implementing the reforms that are being put in place right now. I have to contrast Secretary Richardson's leadership on this issue, frankly, with his predecessors. I believe he shows what can be done when a secretary is seized of the problem and is intent on moving out and addressing it.
MR. RUSSERT: The FBI recommended in April of '97--now, this is two years after you first raised this issue--that background checks on visitors to the nuclear labs be reinstated and that Wen Ho Lee, who was under suspicion, be denied access to classified information. Those FBI recommendations were not put into place for 14 months, until well into 1998. Why?
MR. TRULOCK: That's correct. I--my own personal view is that there was not sufficient urgency within the department and its laboratories about addressing this particular issue, and I must tell you that I do think that there was a predisposition not to accept the findings of our work.
MR. RUSSERT: They questioned whether or not you were telling the truth?
MR. TRULOCK: Openly.
MR. RUSSERT: You also say there was an attempt to cover up and bury your findings.
MR. TRULOCK: That is also correct.
MR. RUSSERT: By whom?
MR. TRULOCK: By officials within the department. I'll tell you that Secretary Richardson has initiated an internal investigation, and I believe the results of that investigation are due out sometime this week.
MR. RUSSERT: You, again, briefed national security adviser Berger in July of '97.
MR. TRULOCK: That's correct.
MR. RUSSERT: Now, this is two years after you first waved red flags about this and a full year and some months after you briefed him the first time.
MR. TRULOCK: That's correct.
MR. RUSSERT: And this is difficult, because you're a government employee.
MR. TRULOCK: Yes.
MR. RUSSERT: But do you believe that the president and his national security adviser acted swiftly and aggressively to deal with this threat initially?
MR. TRULOCK: At that point, in the late summer of 1997, I think that the administration was sufficiently seized with the seriousness of this problem to give us the assistance that we needed at the department. It--the FBI, specifically a man named John Louis, who is now retired, was very aggressive in bringing to bear all of the resources of the administration to help us get the tools and the resources we needed to begin to implement an effective counterintelligence program.
MR. RUSSERT: In July of 1998 you were requested to brief the House Intelligence Committee.
MR. TRULOCK: That's correct.
MR. RUSSERT: Were you allowed to brief them?
MR. TRULOCK: I was not.
MR. RUSSERT: Who denied you approval?
MR. TRULOCK: In this case, then-Deputy Secretary Elizabeth Moeller denied my request to brief chairman Porter Goss, House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee.
MR. RUSSERT: What reason did she give?
MR. TRULOCK: At that time, she told me that she was concerned that they--and I've said in my open testimony I believe by they she was referring to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence-- only wanted to hurt the president on his China policy. Secretary Richardson, when he came in, reversed that policy immediately. The first time that I briefed him on this case was the day that I made some of my initial presentations to the Cox Commission, and his guidance to me was, "You go up there and you tell those people what they need to know.”
MR. RUSSERT: Congressman Cox, Mr. Berger, the national security adviser on this program on March 14th, said that after he was briefed by Mr. Trulock in April of 1996, "I briefed the president.” Did Mr. Berger tell you in your committee that he briefed the president of the United States in April of 1996?
REP. COX: No, he did not. We sent a written interrogatory to the president effectively through the national security adviser. We asked when was the president briefed about nuclear weapons theft at our national laboratories? And the response that we received from the national security adviser in writing was early 1998. Now, subsequent to the completion of our investigation, the national security adviser, Mr. Berger, amended that response and told us in writing that, in fact, he now recalls briefing the president in 1997, although there is no written record of that meeting and it's because of the lack of any written record of that meeting, he says, that their record search didn't turn up in response to our initial interrogatory the correct answer.
MR. RUSSERT: But on this program in March, Mr. Berger said he briefed the president in April of 1996.
REP. COX: Well, that's clearly different than what we were told; although, as you originally stated his response, you said that he replied, "I briefed the president after that, after April 1996,” and certainly '97 or '98 is after 96. Perhaps that's what he meant.
MR. RUSSERT: When did you and Congressman Dicks send your first report to the White House suggesting Chinese espionage at the nuclear labs?
REP. COX: On January 3. We finished our investigation at the conclusion of the 105th Congress and we transmitted the sole copy of our report that left the vault in the Longworth building in Washington to the president himself.
MR. RUSSERT: So Mr. Berger on this program acknowledged he was briefed by Mr. Trulock in April of '96 and then briefed the president. He was briefed by Mr. Trulock in July of '97 and briefed the president. And in January of this year, you sent a report to the White House outlining your findings. Let me put on the screen what the president of the United States said in March of this year. "Can you assure the American people that under your watch, no valuable nuclear secrets were lost?” President Clinton: "Can I tell you there has been no espionage at the labs since I've been president? I can tell you that no one has reported to me that they suspect such a thing has occurred.” Later in the press conference, "To the best of my knowledge, no one has said anything to me about any espionage which occurred by the Chinese against the labs during my presidency.” Mr. Cox, that would suggest that Mr. Berger did not speak to the president ever in '96, '97 or '98, or the president never saw the report you sent him in January.
REP. COX: Well, I would be very concerned if the latter were the case. On February the 4th, I and the ranking Democrat on the select committee, Representative Norm Dicks of Washington, wrote to the president and asked for a private meeting to brief the president on our findings and our recommendations. That meeting was put off until the 22nd of April, but at that time when we met with the president for, if I recall correctly, about 90 minutes, we had a very thorough discussion of not only historical but ongoing problems at the national laboratories and with PRC espionage, so at least from that point, there is no question that the administration and our select committee were all on the same page.
MR. RUSSERT: So when the president says, "To the best of my knowledge, no one has said anything to me about espionage, which occurred by the Chinese against the lab during my presidency,” and he says that in March, is that a truthful statement?
REP. COX: Well, of course, the president is talking about who told him what. And it is the case that Representative Dicks and I didn't personally meet with the president until April the 22nd. As I said, I would be very concerned--we sent him our report which detailed all of these things on the 3rd of January. I would be very concerned if the president didn't know about those things. And one of the things that we pointed out in our report is that for a great deal of time, the appropriate people in our government were not told of these things. The secretary of Commerce, not just the president, but the secretary of Commerce didn't know about these things at the proper time. Even when we delivered our report in January, the secretary of Commerce had not been briefed on the extent of these problems, and yet, the Commerce Department is in charge of determining which high technology to license for sale, even if it's militarily sensitive, to the People's Republic of China. That's a serious problem.
MR. RUSSERT: Mr. Trulock, after you briefed Sandy Berger, the national security adviser, did he ever tell you that he had shared this information with the president?
MR. TRULOCK: No. I had no further contact with Mr. Berger after that briefing.
MR. RUSSERT: Did anyone in the administration tell you that they had informed the president of the United States?
MR. TRULOCK: No.
MR. RUSSERT: Can you conceive of a situation where you, the head of intelligence for the Energy Department, would tell the national security adviser in April of 1996, and again in July of '97, that there was, in fact, Chinese espionage at the nuclear labs, and he in turn would not tell the president?
MR. TRULOCK: I can only tell you that after I briefed Mr. Berger in July of '97, I was sent on the briefing circuit around Washington and briefed all of the senior officials, the secretary of Defense, attorney general and so forth. So it is hard for me to understand the chronology here.
MR. RUSSERT: You went on to say that your warnings were ignored, minimized and ridiculed.
MR. TRULOCK: Yes, sir.
MR. RUSSERT: By whom?
MR. TRULOCK: Primarily by departmental officials and senior officials at the laboratory. It is true that we have at this point briefed over 60 senior officials of the administration, and our conclusions outside of the department have really never been challenged. So most of the opposition and skepticism came from within the laboratories and the department.
MR. RUSSERT: Was there a national security request made for an analysis which conflicted with yours?
MR. TRULOCK: I think that you're referring to the 1997 Central Intelligence Agency assessment. I must tell you that I believe that there are very little--there's a very little difference between the CIA assessment and our assessment. As I've said, I believe that those differences that exist, which are sort of honest, analytical differences, have been overstated and magnified by others.
MR. RUSSERT: In August of 1998, you were demoted.
MR. TRULOCK: I was the director of intelligence until May of 1998, at which point I was removed from that position.
MR. RUSSERT: Why?
MR. TRULOCK: There are bureaucratic reasons which seem perfectly valid. My sense is that I was simply too aggressive and too unwilling to back off this issue and let it die.
MR. RUSSERT: What have you learned from your experience over the last four years?
MR. TRULOCK: I've learned many things. First of all, I believe that it should just not be this difficult for an official in my capacity to bring these issues to the attention of the national leadership, the White House and so forth. I am confident that the programs that Secretary Richardson has put in place, and also that I understand are under consideration on the Hill will mitigate the risks, I think, that we confront at this point.
MR. RUSSERT: How serious do you believe Chinese espionage has damaged our national security?
MR. TRULOCK: I think the potential is on a magnitude equal to the Rosenbergs-Fuchs compromise of the Manhattan Project information. So I concluded in my personal view that the potential damage is very significant.
MR. RUSSERT: What are your future plans?
MR. TRULOCK: My future plans at this point are to remain at the department and to continue to assist with the implementation of the intelligence/counterintelligence programs.
MR. RUSSERT: Has anyone suggested that your job may be in jeopardy for being so outspoken?
MR. TRULOCK: Secretary Richardson, when he first came on board, asked me to stay on as the deputy for the Intelligence Department, so I have had no overt, direct threats along the lines that you alluded.
MR. RUSSERT: Congressman Cox, do you believe that the president has been aggressive enough in dealing with this issue?
REP. COX: Well, there's no question we've had a sea change since the middle of last year when the select committee was formed. And now that these topics can be discussed, at least beginning next Tuesday, in a much more public way--and we'll have a whole outline of what we can talk about publicly-- I think even more can be done. I was just this week on the phone with Secretary Richardson trying to see whether or not we cannot accelerate the plan to put better counterintelligence in place because the top counterintelligence official from the Department of Energy has told us that DOE and National Laboratory counterintelligence standards will not meet--even minimal standards until sometime in the year 2000. I think that's unacceptable. And the secretary and I were talking about the ways that we can accelerate that timetable, because when it comes to our national security, a day late and a dollar short simply isn't good enough.
MR. RUSSERT: Would the country ever heard of the magnitude of this issue without the work and efforts of Notra Trulock?
REP. COX: Frankly, there was a great deal of happenstance here. Obviously, Mr. Trulock knew about these things inside the government. But as he's represented, there were forces trying to prevent him from testifying even to the Congress. One of our select committee's unanimous findings is that the administration did not comply with the terms of the National Security Act, which requires regular reporting to the intelligence committees and the leadership of the House and the Senate. Both the chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence and the ranking Democrat served on my committee and all of us learned of these things for the first time during the pendency of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and military commercial concerns with the People's Republic of China.
MR. RUSSERT: Congressman Chris Cox, we thank you for joining us this morning. We'll be talking to you next week after the report is officially released. Notra Trulock, we thank you very much for joining us this morning on MEET THE PRESS.
MR. TRULOCK: Thank you. My pleasure.
Copyright 1999, National Broadcasting Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
